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Abstract. In this paper, we present a new method for guiding digital forensics 
investigations based on goal-driven requirements engineering methodologies. 
Goal-driven requirements engineering methodologies, like KAOS, facilitate 
modeling and reasoning about goals and requirements as well as their operatio-
nalisation and responsibility assignments.  We believe that this new method will 
lead in the future to better management and organization of the various steps of 
forensics investigations in the cyberspace as well as provide more robust 
ground for reasoning about forensic evidence. 
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1 Introduction 
Digital forensics is a complex and important field emerging as a result of the increas-
ing nature and complexity of modern day cybercrime and the ever increasing utiliza-
tion of computer systems and digital media in real world crimes.  Digital forensics, as 
a result, has grown out of the need to enforce law and justice in the domain of cyber-
space bringing together the whole body of knowledge in computer sciences to the 
legal system of the society.  
 
Various models, e.g. [1-5], have been proposed to capture the process of a digital 
forensics investigation, which have the purpose of managing and organizing a digital 
investigation rather than dictating its specific steps and procedures. Nonetheless, such 
models have remained at an informal level of expressivity and there are very few 
attempts in literature that aim at the formalization of what a digital forensics investi-
gation is [6]. Such formalization would have several benefits [6], which can be classi-
fied as procedural reducing the amount of data and their management, technical al-
lowing digital forensic investigations to be modified regardless of the technological 
changes underlying them, social in that the capabilities of an attack are captured with-
in the social as well as technical dimension and finally legal, in that it allows the ex-
pression of the legal requirements of a digital forensics investigation. 
The approach we introduce in this paper advocates the use of goal-driven formal re-
quirements engineering methodologies, such as KAOS [7], in formalizing the goals, 
procedures and responsibilities involved in any digital forensics investigation.  The 
main product of this approach would be to establish a pattern library for various in-
vestigation models.  This library can then be used to the benefit of the investigators in 
guiding an instance of a digital investigation based on the main goal of the investiga-
tion and providing suggestions for ways to implement the requirements of the investi-
gation and assigning responsibilities to the qualified personnel or automated systems. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a brief over-
view of the KAOS requirements engineering methodology. In Section 3, we demon-
strate how the various elements underlying a digital forensics investigation can be 
expressed in KAOS model elements.  In Section 4, we give an example of this map-
ping applied to network forensics.  Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper giving 
some insight into future pathways for our approach. 
2 Brief Overview of KAOS 
Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Specification (KAOS) is a generic methodology 
based on capturing, structuring and precise formulation of system goals [7]. A goal is 
prescriptive description of system properties, formulated in non-operational terms. A 
system includes not only the software to be developed but also its environment. Goals 
are refined and operationalised in a top-down manner as the system is designed or in a 
bottom-up approach while reengineering existing systems. The approach also sup-
ports adverse environments, composed of possibly malicious external agents trying to 
undermine the system goal rather than to collaborate in the goal fulfillment. 
 
A KAOS model is composed of a number of sub-models. We mention here three such 
sub-models that are mostly relevant to our approach: 
 The goal model captures and structures the assumed and required properties of a 
system by formalising a property as a top-level goal which is then refined to inter-
mediate sub-goals and finally to low-level requirements representing goals that can 
be operationalised. Goals may be organized in AND/OR refinement/abstraction 
hierarchies, where higher-level goals are generally strategic, coarse-grained and 
involve multiple agents whereas lower-level goals are technical, fine-grained and 
involve fewer agents. In such structures, AND-refinement links relate a goal to a 
set of sub-goals possibly conjoined with domain properties or environment as-
sumptions; this means that satisfying all sub-goals in the refinement is a sufficient 
condition in the domain for satisfying the goal. OR-refinement links relate a goal to 
a set of alternative refinements.  KAOS also provides the means for expressing a 
set of desirable properties of the AND/OR refinements, which includes the com-
pleteness, consistency and minimality of the refined sub-goals. 
 The agent model assigns goals to agents in a realizable way. Discovering the re-
sponsible agents is the criterion to stop a goal-refinement process. 
 The operation model details, at a state-transition level, the actions an agent has to 
perform to reach the goals it is responsible for. 
 
It is worth noting that the rigor of the KAOS methodology stems from the fact that 
any concepts defined within its sub-models incorporate formal definitions using Li-
near Temporal Logic (LTL) [9] formulae. In this paper, we do not delve into LTL 
encodings of the forensic requirements, however these have the potential for estab-
lishing formally verified pieces of evidence due to the current support from technolo-
gies such as model checking, theorem proving and static analysis. 
3 Goal-Driven Digital Forensics Investigations 
In this section, we demonstrate how elements of a digital forensic investigation can be 
mapped to KAOS model elements.  We assume that a digital forensic investigation 
consists of processes, actions and the personnel including law enforcement agencies 
and the active systems used by the personnel. 
 
3.1 Forensic Investigations as the Root Goal 
The starting point is to map a forensic investigation into the KAOS goal model. This 
is done by defining the root goal of a KAOS goal tree as a representation of the top-
level digital forensic investigation, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mapping Digital Forensic Investigations 
In this sense, a digital forensic investigation is seen as the top-level goal that the re-
sponsible law enforcement agency aims to achieve, and is therefore the root of the 
KAOS-based goal tree.  Examples of such a goal would be investigate fraud case in 
some bank, investigate case of identity theft, investigate online criminal activity etc. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that such a root goal is necessarily abstract at 
this stage, with the next step aiming at its refinement in terms of more concrete goals. 
3.2 Forensic Processes as Sub-goals 
The next mapping involves the various steps of the investigative process. For simplic-
ity, we adopt McKemmish’s [8] early and simple model, which defines a digital fo-
rensic process as “The process of identifying, preserving, analyzing and presenting 
digital evidence in a manner that is legally acceptable.”  This definition implies the 
activities of identification, preservation, analysis and presentation.  These are mod-
eled in terms of the sub-goals of the root goal representing the top-level investigation, 
as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mapping Digital Forensic Activities 
The specific steps involved in each of these activities will represent further sub-goals 
that must be achieved in order for the activity to be achieved.  Such sub-goals may be 
linked by either the AND or the OR refinement relations.  The refinement of Figure 2 
is an example of an AND-refinement, which implies that unless all the sub-goals 
(identification, preservation, analysis and reporting) are satisfied, the main goal of the 
investigation will not be considered to have been achieved. 
 
A different type of refinement is the OR-refinement, which implies that any of the 
sub-goals is sufficient for the achievement of the parent goal.  For example, in the 
case of the analysis of the image corresponding to a hard disk acquired from the scene 
of a crime, the investigators may need to achieve both of the two different types of 
analysis of log files such as the analysis of the files’ metadata and internal content 
(AND refinement), but may have more than one choice in one of the two analyses, for 
example, the internal analysis may be a choice of either a simple data carving or a 
deeper analysis of hidden and obfuscated data (OR refinement). 
 
Each of the above main activities will be refined until one arrives at the lowest possi-
ble requirements corresponding to specific elements of each activity that cannot be 
refined (detailed) any further.  A requirement is considered a leaf in the goal tree of 
the main investigation. Once all the requirements have been identified, it is necessary 
to a) operationalise by means of appropriate operations and b) assign the require-
ments to the responsible agents. 
3.3 Forensic Actions as Operations 
Once the goal tree has been completely specified starting from the top-level digital 
investigation goal and ending with the leaves corresponding to the low-level require-
ments, these requirements (and consequently the goal tree) need to have the necessary 
and sufficient forensic actions in order for the requirements to be operationalised 
leading to the satisfaction of the main goal of the investigation 
Figure 3 illustrates how the sub-goal Identification can be first refined to the three 
requirements of authorized legal seizures, seizures of suspected PCs and seizures of 
suspected mobile devices.  These then are operationalised in terms of the three opera-
tions: warrant issuing, PC seizure and mobile device seizure.  
 
 
Fig. 3.  Requirements Operationalisation 
In general, the assignment of the requirements to the operations is crucial as it ensures 
that every requirement of the forensic investigation will be satisfied through the ap-
plication of some appropriate operation (or method or activity). 
3.4 Law Enforcement Agencies, Personnel and Systems as Agents 
The final step in our modeling approach is to model law enforcement agencies and 
personnel as well as their active systems in terms of the KAOS agents. For example, 
Figure 4 illustrates a Forensic Investigator agent in relation to the requirements and 
operations of the Identification sub-goal.  The dashed line represents the relation that 
the Forensic Investigator applies the forensic operations operationalising those re-
quirements, whereas the solid line represents the relation that the Investigator is in-
deed responsible for the satisfaction of the requirement to which it is related.  
 
 Fig. 4. Responsibility Assignment 
4 Example: Goal-Driven Network Forensic Investigation 
In this section, we show one simple example where the application of goal-based 
requirements engineering can be useful in guiding and organizing a digital forensic 
investigation for the case of suspicious network behavior or incidents inspired from 
the example by Casey [10].  We have assumed that such an investigation consists of 
the following steps: 
 The preparation and authorization step, which involves the obtaining of the neces-
sary permissions to proceed and the initial gathering of network information. 
 The identification step, which involves the identification of the end-points to the 
network and intermediate systems, the identification of relevant network activities 
and any supporting systems. 
 The documentation, collection and preservation step, which consists of document-
ing the results of initial examinations such as those that would normally be con-
ducted on the network routers.  In the case of Internet activity, this step also will 
involve the recording of any chat sessions conversations with the suspects.  It also 
involves making sure that any log files are preserved securely by ensuring that 
cryptographic operations (e.g. hashing) are applied to preserve their authenticity. 
 The filtering and data reduction step, which will involve the definition of data 
filters and the application of effective search methods of the metadata, in order to 
remove irrelevant data and reduce the size of the relevant state of the network. 
 The evaluation of source step, which involves the locating of the various class and 
individual properties and characteristics such as those relevant to electronic mes-
sages, Web access logs and network traffic. 
 The evidence recovery step, which consists of recovering any deleted and cor-
rupted records and files relevant to the incident, as well as attempting to recover 
volatile/transient data. 
 The investigative reconstruction step, which is about reconstructing the criminal 
scenario through the analysis of various relational, temporal and functional proper-
ties. 
 The reporting step, which is the final step in the forensic investigation process 
involving the preparation of the final forensic report and the presentation of the 
findings of the investigation to the judicial system. 
These steps are modeled as sub-goals in the tree of Figure 5, with the root goal being 
the main goal, i.e. the network forensic investigation. For the sake of simplicity, we 
have omitted further detail related to the refinement of these sub-goals into low-level 
requirements that can be directly implemented using forensic tools and applications. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Part of a Goal Model for a Network Forensics Investigation 
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The execution of the process of a digital forensic investigation can be a complex and 
disorganized exercise, often leading to invalid pieces of evidence or failure in the 
process leading to the reconstruction of such evidence.  Therefore, we agree with 
Eoghan Casey that the use of a formal methodology in describing the process of a 
digital forensics investigation “encourages a complete, rigorous investigation, en-
sures proper evidence handling and reduces the chance of mistakes created by pre-
conceived theories, time pressures and other potential pitfalls.” [10] In this paper, we 
defined one such formal approach based on a well-established and rigorous require-
ments engineering methodology, namely KAOS. 
 
There are many directions this work can be extended to.  First, we plan to provide a 
general goal library of some of the most common patterns of digital forensics investi-
gations and their requirements.  Second, we also plan to investigate other aspects by 
KAOS, such as the anti-goal model [11], in guiding models of attacks in the cyber 
world and their relation to real world crime.  Finally, we also plan to conduct a case 
study from the real world to investigate pros and cons of this method in enhancing the 
process of a digital forensics investigation. 
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